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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Promise to Pay Discharged Debt
Though the Bankruptcy Act does not refer to revival of debts,
a new promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy is gen-
erally actionable without new consideration as a matter of state
law.25 This is true in Louisiana.25 The promise may be made at
any time after filing of the petition in bankruptcy,27 but it must
be "definite, express, distinct, and unambiguous."'2 An expression
that does not amount to a clear and unequivocal promise to pay
is not sufficient.2
The court in Beneficial Finance Co. v. Lalumia8 held that,
in the absence of a new promise, the making of payments on a
note after the debtor had filed his petition in bankruptcy did
not revive liability on the discharged debt or create a new en-
forceable obligation. This is the uniform result.81 Giving a new
note for a debt discharged in bankruptcy does, however, amount
to a new promise that creates an enforceable obligation, as Booty
v. American Finance Corp.82 recognized.88
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Robert A. Pascal*
Divorce Jurisdiction
The decision in Self v. Self' violates the due process clause
by denying to a person the application of the only state's law
which is applicable to him in the only state which can hear his
suit. In so doing it also violates indirectly the full faith and
credit and equal protection clauses of the United States Consti-
tution.
Plaintiff and his wife were separated from bed and board
while domiciled in Louisiana. Subsequently the wife moved her
25. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.33 (1969).
26. Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 21 So.2d 485 (1945), refers to LA.
Civ. CODE arts. 1757, 1759, and states: "The law on this subject is the same
in Louisiana as it is in the other states." Id. at 484, 21 So.2d at 488.
27. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.36 (1969).
28. Id. § 17.34.
29. Securities Fin. Co. v. Marbury, 180 So.2d 737 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
80. 223 So.2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
31. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.37 (1969).
32. 224 So.2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969). The issue arose on a reconven-
tional demand in the debtor's action for damages for invasion of privacy.
33. See Dinger v. Rothery, 10 N.J. Misc. 938, 161 A. 645 (1932).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 So.2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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domicile to Texas and there committed adultery. The plaintiff
sued for divorce in Louisiana under the Louisiana legislation
authorizing divorce for adultery. The suit was dismissed on the
basis of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 10(7), under
which Louisiana has attempted to restrict its divorce jurisdic-
tion to instances in which the spouses were domiciled in Louisi-
ana at the time the cause of action arose or in which the cause
of action arose in Louisiana and the plaintiff is domiciled here
at the time of suit.
Williams v. North Carolina (1942)2 not only recognized (1)
the legislative jurisdiction of the state of the plaintiff's domicile
to have its law apply to his cause and (2) the judicial jurisdic-
tion of that state to hear his suit even if the defendant is not
subject to the personal judicial jurisdiction of its court, but also,
it is submitted, rendered those jurisdictions exclusive. In other
words, one who seeks a divorce may do so only under the laws
of the state in which he is domiciled and may do so only in the
courts of that state.
This view of Williams, admittedly different from that of
many another doctrinaire's, nevertheless is not difficult to sub-
stantiate. In the first place, to permit a state to award a non-
domiciliary plaintiff a divorce under the forum's divorce law is
to deny to the plaintiff's state full faith and credit to its laws,
that is to say, the right to have its laws apply to determine the
right of its citizens to claim a divorce; and this, it will not be
denied, was at the heart of the decision in Williams. In the second
place, it should be clear that the decision in Granville-Smith v.
Granville-Smiths impliedly asserts that a state or territory or
possession might not exercise judicial jurisdiction in a divorce
suit filed by a non-domiciliary plaintiff even if it gives full faith
and credit to his state's legislative jurisdiction by applying that
state's divorce law. 4
2. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
8. 349 U.S. 1 (1954).
4. The decision, though involving Connecticut's denial of recognition to
a Virgin Islands' judgment, was decided on the basis of the United States
Supreme Court's decisions on full faith and credit to sister state judgments,
and in considering this matter the United States Supreme Court was fully
aware of the strong opinion of Justice Hastie in Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1953), a case on all fours with Granvile-Smith, that in personam,
jurisdiction over the defendant should be sufficient if the plaintiff's state's
law on divorce is satisfied. GranviZe-Smith, then, should be viewed as re-
jecting the proposition that such a state of affairs would be sufficient for
divorce jurisdiction and implicitly affirming that only divorce at the domi-
cile of the plaintiff by applying that state's law will suffice. See the au-
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The decision in Self v. Self, therefore, must be considered in
error, even though it conformed to the letter of Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 10(7), not simply because it failed to
construe article 10 (7) according to its spirit,5 but also because
under United States Supreme Court decisions the Louisiana
domiciliary cannot obtain a divorce except under Louisiana law
applied in a Louisiana court. And, also, in denying the plaintiff
this right while allowing other Louisiana plaintiffs to obtain
divorces for adultery under Louisiana law, the plaintiff was
denied equal protection of the laws. Of course the basic difficulty
is with Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 10. A state
may not limit or enlarge its legislative or judicial jurisdiction
as it pleases. As a state of the Union, Louisiana must neither
exercise nor refuse to exercise legislative or judicial jurisdiction
over persons and events in such a manner as will violate the
full faith and credit, due process, equal protection, or other pro-
visions of the United States Constitution. Even if the United
States Constitution were not involved, the philosophically neces-
sary conclusion that the science and art of the conflict of laws
must be viewed as the rational delineation of legislative and
judicial authority among states and nations would lead to the
same result, that a state is not free to act as it pleases in the ex-
ercise of legislative or judicial competence, but that it must act
with just appreciation of the relevant factors involved.
Divorce Recognition
The Louisiana judiciary continues to overextend the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in Sherrer v. Sherrer,0 Coe v.
Coe,7 and Johnson v. Muelberger,s to the point where it may be
said, not unjustly, that the Louisiana decisions have the effect of
giving aid and comfort to those parties who wish to evade Lou-
isiana's rightful legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the
marital status of its citizens.
The main issue in both Didier v. Didier9 and Staples v.
Staples'0 was whether Louisiana must give full faith and credit
thor's comments on this matter in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Court for the 1966-1967 Term-Conflict of Laws, 28 IA. L. REv. 312, 322-26
(1968).
5. See p. 345 for the discussion by Assistant Professor L'Enfant.
6. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
7. 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
8. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
9. 230 So.2d 436 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
10. 232 So.2d 904 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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to an Arkansas divorce granted to a person, domiciled in Lou-
isiana under the traditional notions of interstate domicile, on
the basis of an Arkansas statute establishing a presumption that
a person residing in Arkansas for three months is domiciled
there. In each case the Louisiana court considered itself obli-
gated to honor the judgment because Arkansas courts considered
the statute in question and the judgments based thereon to be
valid! In addition, in Didier, but not in Staples, the defendant had
signed a waiver and entry of appearance, and that factor was
considered sufficient to render the issue of true domicile in Ar-
kansas beyond dispute.
Sherrer, Coe, and Johnson do go far in the direction of treat-
ing the jurisdictional essential of domicile as res judicata in di-
vorce recognition cases if the defendant appeared and partici-
pated in the divorce suit, even if the issue of the defendant's
domicile was not raised. Whatever may be thought of these de-
cisions, it is nevertheless true that the United States Supreme
Court has never said that a "waiver of citation" and "entry of
appearance" amount to the appearance and participation con-
templated by Sherrer, Coe, and Johnson. To give these United
States Supreme Court decisions such extreme application only
contributes more than did Sherrer, Coe, and Johnson themselves
to assisting spouses who are not permitted divorces under their
own states' laws to obtain them by "conferring" jurisdiction on
states other than their own. This kind of practice can only bring
discredit on the judiciary and encourage the further abuse of
law by the members of the bar. Didier, therefore, like Boudreaux
v. Welch11 before it, cannot be given approval.
The primary question in Didier and Staples, however, was
whether Louisiana must recognize Arkansas as being the "do-
micile" of the plaintiffs if "domicile" was "proven," not by refer-
ence to the traditional law of domicile referred to in Williams v.
North Carolina 112 and subsequent decisions, but by an Arkansas
statutory presumption of domicile based on mere continuous
presence in the state for three months. It should stand to reason
that if "domicile" is to be used as a criterion of interstate divorce
jurisdiction, the definition of domicile cannot be subject to change
from state to state; and to establish a presumption of domicile
11. 249 La. 983, 192 So.2d 356 (1966), commented on by the author in
The Work of the Louis4ana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Con-flict of Laws, 28 LA. L. REv. 312, 322-26 (1968).
12. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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from circumstances which of themselves do not reasonably lead
to the conclusion that a domicile-in-fact has been established, is
in effect to change the definition of domicile or to attempt to
circumvent the requirement of domicile. The unlawfulness of
such legislative attempts to evade the requirements of the full
faith and credit clause as construed and applied by the United
States Supreme Court has never been considered as such by that
court, but it was demonstrated ably in the majority opinion in
Alton v. Alton.13 The Louisiana judiciary cannot be obligated by
either the legislative or judicial act of a sister state defining for
itself an interstate jurisdictional factor, and the judges should
not have given any effect whatsoever to the self-serving Arkansas
statutes and judgments on the question. Louisiana can, in this
respect, be obligated only by acts of Congress or decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, for the criteria for interstate legis-
lative and judicial competence are necessarily federal questions
under the full faith and credit clause.
Disavowal of Paternity
Stewart v. Stewart14 disallowed a Louisiana husband's suit
to disavow under Louisiana law a child born to his wife during
separation from bed and board and while she was domiciled in
Tennessee. The narrow ground for the decision was that a suit
for disavowal was not included in Code of Civil Procedure article
10 as one of "status" over which Louisiana would exercise ju-
dicial jurisdiction even if the defendant were not domiciled in
this state, and therefore that the suit must be treated as one in
personam to be tried where the child's representative could be
sued. It is true that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
10 does not list the action for disavowal, but the article's enu-
meration of causes need not have been regarded as exclusive. It
would have been better to recognize that the nature of a suit is
determined by its object, and that the object of this suit not only
was one of status, but principally one of the status of the husband
-his legal relationship to his wife's child, and only incidentally
one of the child's relationship to him. It would be a strange
notion of the proper allocation of legislative jurisdiction to per-
mit the Louisiana husband's legal relationship to the child to be
determined by the law of another state or country simply be-
cause his wife happened to move there after separation from
13. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
14. 233 So.2d 305 (La. App. st Cir. 1970).
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bed and board.'5 If Louisiana law applies, and the plaintiff is
asking, for a determination of his status under that law, then
there can be little justification in denying him the application
of that law in Louisiana's courts. The analogy to ex parte di-
vorce cases should be obvious. In any event, as mentioned in
the discussion under "Divorce Jurisdiction" above, the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure's assertions or denials of jurisdiction in
particular instances cannot prevail against what would have to
be considered a rational scheme for the delineation of interstate
legislative and judicial jurisdiction under the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution. The writer, at
least, doubts that the judgment in Stewart would meet that test.
Tutorship
Two decisions should be noted here. In Emery v. Emery16
an Arkansas father with custody of his daughter under a valid
Arkansas judgment brought habeas corpus proceedings in Lou-
isiana against his wife for refusing to return the daughter to him
after the termination of a period of visitation. Inasmuch as civil
habeas corpus addresses itself to the authority of the respondent
to detain another, and the respondent had no such authority
under the valid Arkansas judgment, the child should have been
returned to her father's custody without other proceedings. The
lower and appellate courts, however, permitted the mother by
her answer to convert the proceedings into one for "custody" and,
on a finding that the child's welfare would be served better if
she were in the mother's care, gave "custody" to the mother.
Granting that the child's best welfare might be served better in
the mother's care, it is nevertheless true that procedural forms
should not be misused. The father's right under the Arkansas
judgment should have been recognized as a matter of full faith
and credit until such time as by judgment in Arkansas and under
Arkansas law-Arkansas being the domicile of the child and her
father-a change in guardianship or custody had been effected.
Decisions like Emery and Lucas v. Lucas'7 do more to encourage
15. RESTATEMONT OF CONFLCT Or LAWS (SECOND), PROPOSED OrICIAL DRAFT
I 287(2)(a) (1969) confirms this approach by assigning legislative jurisdic-
tion to the state in which the "parent" In question was domiciled at the time
the relationship is claimed to have been created.
16. 223 So.2d 680 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
17. 195 So.2d 771 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 250 La. 539, 197
So.2d 81 (1967). Discussed by the author in The Work of the Loui4aina Ap-
pellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term--Conftct of Laws, 28 LA. L. Rv. 812,
822-26 (1968).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
interparental piracy of children than to promote stability in law-
fully declared rights. This is not to say that a child physically
in Louisiana who proves to be neglected, abandoned, or delin-
quent might not be taken from whomsoever had custody and
placed in the care of another under lawful procedures in juve-
nile court, but the civil courts of this state have no authority to
determine "custody" controversies after divorce or separation
except in tutorship suits founded on grounds therefor listed in
the Code of Civil Procedure. What authority district courts had
to separate custody from paternal authority and tutorship were
taken from them when R.S. 9:551-9:553 were repealed by Act
111 of 1956.
Legg v. Legg,18 also a "custody" case, nevertheless presented
different legal circumstances. A mother who had been awarded
"custody" in Alabama, but who had been forbidden to take the
child out of Alabama without judicial authorization, moved to
Louisiana with the child without obtaining such authorization.
Thereafter the father sought and obtained, in the same Alabama
proceeding in which the mother had been awarded custody, a
judgment awarding him the child's custody. The mother re-
ceived notice, but did not participate in these proceedings. The
father then brought habeas corpus proceedings in Louisiana, us-
ing this judgment as his authority to have the child's custody.
Judge (now Justice) Tate's opinion affirmed the authority of the
Alabama court to render its second judgment awarding custody
to the father, asserting it had "continuing jurisdiction" over the
mother; but at the same time the opinion upheld the lower court's
refusal to return the child to its father on the basis of "circum-
stances" having "changed" since the date of the second Alabama
judgment. The writer agrees that the denial of the father's de-
mand was correct, but for other reasons. The heart of the matter
is whether a parent awarded custody can be forbidden to remove
the child from the boundaries of the state awarding him or her
custody. Here the answer should be in the negative. An affir-
mative answer would place too great a price on a parent's right
to live where he or she chooses to live. If the parent with cus-
tody moves to a place in which the child cannot be reared in
humanly acceptable circumstances, the other parent certainly
would have the right to seek custody in the courts of that place
and under its laws. Both solutions have their difficulties, but
this writer's judgment is that the parent given tutorship after
18. 228 So.2d 202 (La. App. 8d Cir. 1969).
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divorce or separation should not be restricted in his or her right
to move with the child where he or she pleases. This would in-
crease the stability of relations of the spouses after a separation
or divorce and probably would result in more good to the child
by rendering suits over his tutorship less likely.
Matrimonial Regimes
Anglo-American law does not have the concept of a "matri-
monial regime," but speaks in terms of the interests of the spouses
in the property of the other. As a result, what would be treated
as matrimonial regime law in civil law jurisdictions is treated
in Anglo-American jurisdictions as aspects of the laws on mov-
able and immovable property, even for purposes of the conflict
of laws. Hence it is that in Anglo-American conflicts law, spouses'
rights in immovables "arising out of marriage" generally have
been placed under the law of the situs of the immovable, and
those in movables generally under the law of the domicile of
the spouses at the time of acquisition. Louisiana, on the other
hand, has attempted to go its own separate way. By Act 292 of
1852 (now article 2400 of the Civil Code), "[A]ll property ac-
quired in this state by non-resident married persons ... shall be
subject to the same provisions of law which regulate the commu-
nity of acquets and gains between citizens of this state." Pilcher
v. Paulk9 and Crichton v. Succession of Crichton" must be evalu-
ated in these contexts.
In Pilcher, the court seemed to apply the Anglo-American
conflicts rule, rather than Louisiana Civil Code article 2400, to
say an immovable acquired in Louisiana by a Texas husband
would be subject to Louisiana law in all matters relating to it.
On this basis the court concluded that the immovable was a com-
munity asset and that the "settlement" entered into before di-
vorce between the Texas husband and wife would be invalid as
to this immovable. In Crichton, the court of appeal enforced a
New York judgment treating movables acquired in Louisiana
by a New York domiciliary as his separate assets in spite of Lou-
isiana Civil Code article 2400, but did so on the basis of full faith
and credit even though it regarded the New York judgment
based on a "misconstruction" of article 2400.
19. 228 So.2d 663 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
20. 232 So.2d 109 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 256 La. 274, 236
So.2d 39 (1970), because "the result is correct."
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Both Pilcher and the court of appeal decision in Crichton
may be criticized for misconstruing Louisiana law to mean that
any asset acquired in this state by a "non-resident" is to be con-
sidered a community asset. Under Louisiana Civil Code article
2334 an asset acquired with community funds is a community
asset, but not one acquired with separate funds; and whereas
article 2400 renders assets acquired by "non-residents" "subject
to" the laws on the community of gains, it does not as such make
the acquisition a community asset. Indeed, if article 2400 treated
acquisitions by "non-residents" differently from the manner it
treated acquisitions by domiciliaries, it might be invalid under
the equal protection clause. Under the facts in Pilcher, the
spouses being Texans living under Texas community property
law, an application of article 2400 required a determination
whether the funds used to purchase the asset would have been
considered community funds under that law. The court, how-
ever, did not make this inquiry. In Crichton, the acquiring
spouse having been a New Yorker living under a regime of sepa-
ration of property, the application of article 2400 should have
resulted in a judgment that the movables in Louisiana were his
separate assets. The supreme court probably realized this, for
it refused to review the court of appeal's decision in Crichton on
the ground that "the result is correct,"21 indicating it did not
agree with the reasoning of the court in at least some particular.22
The court of appeal's opinion in Pilcher also denied the
validity of a pre-divorce "property settlement" between husband
and wife, at least as to the Louisiana land, by applying the ex
rei sitae to that question. The opinion in this respect is in keep-
ing with the traditional Anglo-American conflict of laws prac-
tice, but it is submitted that the rule is to be criticized. Whether
spouses may terminate or modify their matrimonial regime by
convention during marriage, or otherwise contract during mar-
riage, is a question which should be considered under the legis-
lative jurisdiction of the domicile of the spouses. Why should a
state which has no connection with the spouses, other than the
fact one or more of them owns something here, seek to prescribe
their capacity to contract generally or their power to contract
21. 256 La. 274, 236 So.2d 39 (1970).
22. The issue of the validity of article 2400 of the Louisiana Civil Code
is not raised here, but it is a serious question. Unless it conforms to an
appropriate assignment of legislative jurisdiction within the framework of
the full faith and credit clause, it is invalid. But this issue cannot be dis-
cussed at length in this symposium.
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with each other? Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Second),
Proposed Official Draft § 223, comment c, acknowledges that
what the court did in Pilcher conforms to the general practice,
but notes that application of the law of the spouses' domicile
would be appropriate in this kind of case. The science and the
art of the conflict of laws needs much refinement.
Offenses and QuasiOffenses
Conflict of laws rules in the United States often shock juris-
prudes to whom the law should be the product of the science and
the art of the good and the just in societal life. In the last twen-
ty-five years especially, awakened consciences on the bench and
in the law schools have produced a literature, not always con-
sistent, not yet completely free of the positivistic, anti-philo-
sophical notions of "sovereignty" and "state power" which deny
all obligatory criteria of order save political force, but striving
nevertheless to bring some semblance of a reasonable connec-
tion between parties and events and the law applied to order
them. Of all the conflicts rules, perhaps none has come more to
engender a sense of injustice than the rule that the law of the
place of events resulting in harm to another should determine
whether the acts of the one constitute an actionable wrong (of-
fense or quasi-offense), whether the acts of the other or the par-
ticular circumstances constitute a bar to his recovery, whether
the relationship of the parties bars a remedy permanently or
temporarily, and what should be the measure of recovery. Slowly
it has come to be realized that the place of occurrence of events
may be purely accidental and have much less relevance to the
parties and to what should be their rights and obligations under
the circumstances. Why, for example, should husband and wife
who are part of the political community of State X, under whose
laws spouses are liable to each other for personal injuries, not
be considered so entitled or obligated merely because the injuries
occurred in State Y, in which they were but temporarily, under
whose laws personal injuries do not give rise to legal rights and
obligations between husband and wife? Why, again, should a
guest passenger be barred from recovery against his host driver
merely because the injury occurred in a state denying recovery to
guests under the circumstances, when the state in which the host
and guest are domiciled-with whose law, or plan of order, they
have identified themselves by living there-would give the guest
a remedy against his host? In Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Insur-
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ance Co.,28 nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit 24 which
had rejected the application of the lex loci delicti rule to allow a
Louisiana domiciliary recovery against another Louisiana domi-
ciliary for injuries suffered while a guest in the former's auto-
mobile and driving in Arkansas on their way from Louisiana to
Iowa. The supreme court's majority opinion, to which Justice
Sanders dissented, gives sufficient references to the changing
thought on the subject; but its stated reasons for continuing to
apply the rule of lex loci delicti, in spite of their length and ar-
gumentative tone, appear to the writer to evidence less concern
with a reasonable delineation of legislative jurisdiction-or ap-
plying the law applicable to the regulation of the rights and
obligations of the parties-than they do with mere judicial con-
venience.20 There can be no doubt that a conflicts rule having the
force of custom on a national scale should not be discarded light-
ly; but once any custom has been shown to be unreasonable it
becomes necessary to reject it in favor of a more reasonable
regulation. The position taken by the Restatement of Conflict
of Laws (Second), Proposed Official Draft is that conflict of
laws rules based on decisions are subject to re-evaluation and
change,2 and in the particular matter of guest passenger liability
the Restatement Draft, as noted by the supreme court, leans to-
ward the rejection of the application of the lex loci delicti.27 The
supreme court should reconsider the Johnson decision at its first
opportunity.
CRIMINAL LAW
Dale E. Bennett*
Aggravated Arson-Danger to Firemen
Foreseeable danger to human life is an essential and dis-
tinguishing element of aggravated arson.1 Thus, within the Lou-
isiana Criminal Code definition, the burning during business
23. 256 La. 289, 236 So.2d 216 (1970).
24. 218 So.2d 375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
25. The supreme court rebuked the court of appeal for failing to follow
its previous decisions on the matter. See the author's and Assistant Pro
fessor Tate's discussion of this facet of the decision at p. 185 supra.
26, RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (SECOND), PROPOSED OFFIcAL DRAFT
§ 5 (1969).
27. Id. § 145, comment(e), under "The place where the relationship
between the parties . .. is centered," and fllustration 1 thereunder.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 14:51 (Supp. 1970).
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